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Uniform Commercial Code: Stopping Collection of an
Item Deposited With an Insolvent Depositary Bank
Recently, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals considered whether collection
of a cashier's check could be stopped by a payee of the check when the payee's
depositary bank became insolvent. In New Covenant Community Church v.
Federal National Bank & Trust Co.,' a payee unsuccessfully sought to pre-
vent the issuing bank from paying its cashier's check. Living Way Church
had indorsed and delivered to New Covenant a $325,000 cashier's check, issued
by Federal National to Living Way and New Covenant, in satisfaction of a
prior debt. New Covenant deposited the check in Penn Square Bank on July
1, 1982. On July 2, 1982, Penn Square was closed by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
Both Living Way and New Covenant requested Federal National to stop
payment on the cashier's check. The bank refused to do so. After Penn Square
failed, the check was presented to, and paid by, Federal National. New Coven-
ant incurred a loss on the check because FDIC insurance was limited to
$100,000. New Covenant then sued Federal National to recover both its loss
on the check and $1 million in punitive damages.
2
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of the action in an
unenlightening opinion. The court's analysis failed to extend beyond the time-
worn recitation that a cashier's check is accepted upon issuance and, therefore,
a stop order is not effective under section 4-303 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (Code).' Without further analysis or consideration, the court rejected
the plaintiff's assertion that the depositary bank's status as an agent of the
depositor had been revoked by its insolvency. The plaintiff argued that this
revocation caused two results: the depositary bank lost its authority to collect
the check, and the payor bank lost its authority to pay the funds to the
depository bank. The court did not consider either argument in its opinion.
This note will examine the unanswered questions raised by the plaintiff in
New Covenant. Specifically, it considers whether a bank customer may stop
payment of an item to prevent a loss from occurring as a result of the
depositary bank's insolvency. This is the question the Oklahoma Court of
1. 58 OKLA. B.J. 599 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (mandate issued by the Oklahoma Court of
Appeals on Apr. 10, 1987, 58 O uA. B.J. 1076 (1987)).
2. Id. at 599-600. The exact extent of New Covenant's loss is not known at this time. Penn
Square has paid 60 percent and may pay more at a later date.
3. Id. at 600. U.C.C. § 4-303(1)(9) (1978) provides that a stop order comes too late to sus-
pend payment if the order comes after the bank has already accepted or certified the disputed
item. There is a large body of case law and commentary that adopts the position that it is generally
not possible for a bank to dishonor its cashier's check. See Note, Uniform Commercial Code:
A Bank's Right to Dishonor a Cashier's Check, 38 OKLA. L. Rav. 359 (1985).
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Appeals failed to analyze or even to recognize in New Covenant. The essen-
tial issue in New Covenant was not whether a cashier's check was susceptible
to a stop order. Rather, the question was whether the plaintiff's attempt to
revoke the depositary bank's agency status was a valid solution, and if not,
what alternatives were available to the customer.
This note will focus on two potential remedies for the problems encountered
in attempting to prevent collection of an item deposited prior to a depositary
bank's insolvency: (1) revocation of a bank's status as the customer's agent
for purposes of collection (as unsuccessfully raised in New Covenant); and
(2) application of the adverse claim procedure contained in UCC section 3-603."
In preventing collection of a deposited item, these two procedures are par-
ticularly applicable to cashier's checks because the party who obtains a cashier's
check cannot use a stop order under section 4-403. If an item is a regular
check, the drawer could stop payment by using a section 4-403 stop order
and seemingly avoid the problem encountered in New Covenant.' Nevertheless,
this note considers items for deposit in general and is not confined to cashier's
checks.
Revocation of Depositary Bank's Agency Status
The principal/agent relationship between a customer and its bank was firmly
established in pre-Code common law and was subsequently adopted by the
Code.' Specifically, section 4-201(1) provides that: "Unless a contrary intent
clearly appears and prior to the time that a settlement given by a collecting
bank for art item is or becomes final . . . the bank is an agent or sub-agent
of the owner of the item." ' 7 The Official Comment to this section reiterates
that the agency status of depositary and collecting banks is a fundamental
concept of the banking system.'
Although an agency relationship clearly exists under the Code, the ques-
tion arises whether a depositary bank's agency status is revoked upon
insolvency. Analysis of that issue requires an examination of section 4-214,
which dictates how insolvency affects the collection process. Subsections (1)
and (3) of section 4-214 provide that if an item has come into the possession
of a payor or collecting bank that becomes insolvent before the item is paid,
the receiver shall return the item to the customer or presenting bank.' However,
4. U.C.C. § 3-603 (1978) allows a party to discharge its liability, as drawer, on an instru-
ment by payment or satisfaction to the holder unless another person provides the liable party
with indemnity or obtains an injunction against the payment of the instrument.
5. U.C.C § 4-403(1) (1978) states that a customer may order his bank to stop payment on
an item, provided that the bank receives the order in a reasonable time and manner. If a regular
check were involved, the payee would have to convince the drawer customer to stop payment;
but absent unusual circumstances that should not pose a problem.
6. U.C.C. § 4-201 comment 2 (1978).
7. Id. § 4-201(1).
8. Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 4-201 (1978) states that a bank's status as an agent
of the customer is a "strong presumption." Official Comment 3 to the same section concludes
that the agency status of collecting banks is consistent with current law and commercial practice.




if the item has been paid, the customer or presenting bank has a preferred
claim against the failed bank.10 Unfortunately, a preferred claim against an
insolvent bank may be of dubious value. Thus, the key to obtaining a com-
plete recovery is to prevent payment of the item.
One might initially conclude, in light of section 4-214, that the Code con-
templates that an owner can always stop the collection of an item when the
depositary bank has become insolvent. If that were indeed the case, the New
Covenant result could have been avoided because the check would have been
returned to New Covenant upon Federal National's nonpayment. On the other
hand, if the check were paid, New Covenant would have had a claim against
Penn Square Bank.
Unfortunately, the solution to the insolvency problem is not so simple. Sec-
tion 4-214 does not halt the collection of the item; rather, it allows the check
to be paid and then gives the customer a preferred claim. Revocation of agency
differs from section 4-214 because revoking the agency status stops the col-
lection process. Revoking the agency status would return the unpaid item to
the customer. The customer would logically prefer the unpaid instrument itself,
rather than a preferred claim, because the funds available for distribution
may not be sufficient to pay the item. FDIC insurance only covers $100,000
and, as seen in New Covenant, this can result in a potential loss to the customer
equal to the amount of the check that exceeds that coverage. A complete
recovery on the item can only be assured if the unpaid instrument is actually
returned to the customer so the item may be presented directly to the solvent
party liable on the item.
The basic question then becomes whether the revocation of agency theory
is an appropriate means by which a customer can recover an item from the
collection process when the customer's depositary bank has failed. Under the
Code the customer is the principal in the relationship and the depositary bank
is the customer's agent." Should not a customer be able to revoke its bank's
authority to -collect items on its behalf? Surely it cannot be argued that the
customer must consent to an irrevocable principal/agent relationship. More
important, if this agency status can be revoked, what is the process for such
revocation?
These questions were addressed in Wolf v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co. 2
10. Id. § 4-214(2), (4) (1978). If a party has a preferred claim, that party is allowed to enforce
its claim against the funds in the insolvent entity before the general creditors are able to share
pro rata in the distribution of the funds. A preference may allow the party to collect a higher
percentage of its claim than the general creditors are able to collect, but a preference does not
guarantee full recovery. Moreover, it is doubtful the state law preference is valid where the insol-
vent bank is a national bank. See Jennings v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 294 U.S.
216 (1935). See infra notes 33-36.
11. U.C.C. § 4-201(1) (1978). o
12. 251 A.D. 354, 296 N.Y.S. 800 (1937), aff'd, 277 N.Y. 626, 14 N.E.2d 193 (1938). Wolf
sold Title Guarantee bonds, taking a cashier's check in payment. Wolf deposited the check in
his account at the Bank of the United States. The depositary bank was declared insolvent the
next day. Wolf notified Title Guarantee that the bank's authority to collect the check had been
revoked and directed it not to pay the check. The check was either at the Bank of the United
19871
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In Wolf the court allowed Wolf to recover in conversion against the issuer
of a cashier's check under the revocation of agency theory. The court reasoned
that neither the depositary nor the collecting bank had title to the disputed
item, a cashier's check issued by Title Guarantee. The depositary bank was
merely the customer's agent in the transaction. Furthermore, the collecting
bank could not derive title from the depositary bank. Rather, the collecting
bank was the depositary bank's agent and, thus, the subagent of the customer.
In short, title to the check remained in the customer until payment was made
by Title Guarantee."
The Wolf court held that by giving notice to Title Guarantee, the customer
had revoked the authority of its agent and subagents to collect the item. 4
Payment of the instrument by Title Guarantee after receiving notice of the
owner's revocation of the depositary bank's authority to collect the item con-
stituted conversion. The court also stated that if Title Guarantee was in doubt
as to whether to pay the check, it should have withheld payment or tendered
the money into court pending an investigation."1 Moreover, it concluded that
the particular nature of the check did not affect whether a customer could
revoke its bank's agency status. The customer could revoke the general author-
ity of his agent to collect "instruments," the type of instrument involved neither
affected nor diminished this authority. 6
Similarly, the revocation of agency theory was applied to a personal check
in Union Tra't Co. v. Berry.'7 Once again, the court held that the depositary
bank had no right to an item, other than as an agent of the customer."I The
customer could deal with the bank as its agent until the proceeds of the item
were collected by the bank. Furthermore, the authority of the depositary bank
to credit the customer's account did not arise until it had received the money. '
In order to fully analyze whether a bank customer can revoke its bank's
agency statas, it is helpful to consider the general principles of agency law.
States or at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at that time.
Title Guarantee paid the check. Wolf sued the Superintendent of Banks and collected most
of the amount of the item. Volf then sued Title Guarantee for the difference, plus costs.
13. Id., 296 N.Y.S. at 803.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id., 296 N.Y.S. at 804.
17. 186 Ark. 966, 57 S.W.2d 413 (1933). In this case, Berry and Magness received a check
for payment on a sale of cattle to a third party. Magness deposited the check in Western Grove
Bank, which sent the item to Union Trust. Western Grove was then declared insolvent; payment
was stopped on the item. The amount of the check was paid into court by stipulation of the
parties. Union Trust instituted attachment proceedings to recover the proceeds which had been
paid into court. The court thus approved an adverse claim procedure similar to the one con-
tained in U.C.C. § 3-603.
18. Id., 57) S.W.2d at 414.
19. Id. Similarly, in First State Bank v. Lisles, 144 Okla. 156, 289 P. 1105, 1106 (1930),
the court alloned a depositor to recover the amount of his check that had been deposited in
a bank that subsecuently became insolvent. The court held that the principal/agent relationship
between a customer and his bank continued throughout the period of a particular transaction




The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides that the bankruptcy of an agent
terminates that agent's authority to conduct the principal's transactions if,
upon knowledge of the agent's insolvency, the principal would not consent
to further exercise of that authority. 20 This restatement of the common law
not only parallels the reasoning adopted in Wolf and Union Trust but also
reflects a fundamental premise of a principal/agent relationship-the prin-
cipal may terminate the agency relationship at any time. The Code has ex-
plicitly adopted the principal/agent relationship for transactions between a
customer and its bank. 2' Therefore, it should follow that the Code has also
adopted the common law principles that apply to that relationship.
The principal/agency relationship between a customer and its bank is fur-
ther examined in Zollmann's Law of Banks and Banking, a depression-era
treatise.2 2 Zolman examined then-current cases involving bank failures in order
to ascertain the effect of insolvency upon the status of the principal/agent
relationship between a customer and its bank. At the outset, he formed several
general conclusions regarding the basic principles that govern this relation-
ship. He concluded that a customer's right to revoke its bank's authority to
collect an item may be exercised any time prior to collection. This right of
revocation can either be express or implied. Moreover, refusal of the depositary
bank to abide by this revocation constitutes conversion.23
Zollman also found that termination of the agency status could be accom-
plished by an order to the drawee from the true owner of the item directing
the drawee to withhold payment. Alternatively, an injunction against the clearing
house and collecting bank prohibiting collection of the item could be used
to revoke the agency status. 24 The latter constituted the most extreme means
of revocation and gave notice to anyone with knowledge of the injunction
that the agency status was terminated.25
As to specific situations involving insolvency, Zollman concluded that insolv-
ency of the depositary bank was sufficient ground for revocation of that bank's
agency status. He cited numerous cases holding that insolvency of the bank
ipso facto dissolved the agency relationship because the bank was disqualified
from performing its duties as an agent of the customer.26
20. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 113 (1958).
21. U.C.C. § 4-201 (1978).
22. 8 C. ZomAsNN, BANKs AND BAMEING § 5476 (1936). Bank failure was an issue of enor-
mous concern during the Great Depression and was the subject of frequent litigation. The inci-
dence of bank insolvency decreased dramatically after that time and for many years was a rarity.
Thus, the issues involved in a bank's insolvency have not been addressed by the courts since
the depression. Recently, however, bank failures have resurfaced in substantial numbers generating
a great deal of litigation, particularly in Oklahoma and Texas. The courts addressing these issues
must look to depression-era treatment for resolution.
23. Id. § 5476, at 261.
24. Id at 261-62.
25. Id. at 262.
26. Id. For the proposition that a bank's insolvency terminates its agency, see id. §§ 5441-46;
Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Moore, 25 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1928); Josiah Morris & Co. v. Alabama
Carbon Co., 139 Ala. 620, 36 So. 764 (1904); Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., 88 Conn.
19871
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Finally, Zolman discussed the now-defunct trust theory as a means by which
the customer could recover the proceeds from an item when the depositary
or collecting bank became insolvent.27 In applying the trust theory to an in-
solvent depositary bank, Zollman concluded that an item deposited prior to
insolvency that remained uncollected would be impressed with a trust. If the
instrument had been collected, then the proceeds of the collection became
the subject of trust in favor of the customer." The owner of the item could
enjoin the bank from attempting the collection, or it could recover the amount
of the item as a preferred claim.29
The portion of Zollman's analysis that is based on the trust theory is now
largely irrelevant. The trust theory is expressly rejected by the Code in Of-
ficial Comment 2 to section 4-214.3o The trust theory was also rejected by
the United States Supreme Court in Jennings v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co."
Abolition of the trust theory by Jennings and by the Code, however, has
not terminated the possibility that a customer may revoke its bank's agency
status. Revoking a bank's agency status and its authority to collect items for
the customer does not establish a preferred claim, which is directed against
the existing funds of the insolvent bank. Rather, it is designed to get the item
back uncollected, so that the owner of the item may collect it himself. In
contrast to the trust theory, revocation of agency intervenes prior to pay-
ment, before the funds have been designated for the insolvent bank. The in-
solvent bank has lost nothing because at this point it has received nothing.
Revoking agency simply allows the funds to reach the party intended to receive
them.
As discussed previously, the Code contemplates revocation of agency status
by its express adoption of the principal/agent relationship between a customer
and its bank. This remedy is based on general agency law and is compatible
with the Code. 32 It is fundamental that in any agency context the principal
can revoke its agent's authority. It would be absurd to create a principal/agent
relationship in which the principal could not terminate the agency status.
Thus, the bank customer, as principal, should be allowed to give notice
185, 90 A. 369 (1914); In re Vavoudis, 141 Misc. 823, 252 N.Y.S. 779 (1931), aff'd, 233 A.D.
672, 249 N.Y.S. 870 (1931). See also Brennan v. Holden, 4 F. Supp. 285, 287 (D. Mass. 1933),
rev'd sub nom. Pearson v. Brennan, 75 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1985). The authority of a collecting
bank ends when it ceases to function as a bank. However, under section 4-214, per se termina-
tion would appear to be no longer true. See U.C.C. § 4-214 comment 1 (1978).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 33-36.
28. 8 C. Zoizu N, supra note 22, § 5441, at 231-35.
29. Id.
30. U.C.C. f. 4-214 comment 2 (1978).
31. 294 U.S. 216, 218, 224 (1935). In an opinion authored by Justice Cardozo, the United
States Supreme Court expressly rejected the use of a trust theory. A collecting bank became
insolvent before it was able to collect a draft from the drawee bank to the depositary bank.
The payee of the check brought an action against the assets to the extent of the draft and to
recover payment. The court refused to uphold the validity of the trust.




of its revocation of the agency status to its agents, subagents, or the drawee.
This notice should be effective if it comes before payment of the item. If
the depository bank has already allowed the customer to draw on provisional
credit, then under sections 4-201, 4-208, and 4-209 the bank would have a
security interest in the item superior to the owner's rights.33 The depository
bank would occupy the role of a secured party, in addition to its status as
the customer's agent. 34 This additional status would allow the bank to pro-
ceed with the collection of the item. If the item was returned by a bank to
the owner and the owner did not repay the depositary bank, then, as any
secured party, the bank would have a right to possession of the item or its
proceeds.
5
As to the form of notice, a customer could inform the depositary bank
that it was no longer the agent of the customer and thus not authorized to
collect items on the customer's behalf. The depositary bank would then
presumably be required to relay this message. If it sent this message through
collection channels, much in the same manner as it sends items for payment,
then the notice would probably be ineffective because it would be difficult
to catch a previously forwarded item. This type of notice would probably
allow the instrument to come into the hands of the payor and be paid before
notice of revocation could stop payment. On the other hand, telephone notice
to the payor might be timely. However, telephone notice should not be valid
unless it is verified in writing and indemnity is supplied. These requirements
make it difficult to utilize this form of notice in a timely fashion. 6 Thus,
the only type of notice that should be allowed to stop the collection process,
whether given indirectly or directly by the owner, should be one that ade-
quately protects the payor.
Even so, notice from the depositary bank could cause the payor further
difficulty by forcing it to decide who has the better right to the item-the
collecting bank holder or the nonholder asserted owner. Moreover, a ques-
tion arises as to what would be the remedy of the owner if its agent failed
to send any notice. Presumably, there would be no remedy because the agent
is insolvent. In the final analysis, the only feasible form of notice is notice
directly from the owner to the payor.
Adverse Claim Procedure Under the UCC
The Code deals with the issue of notice to the payor in the adverse claim
procedure contained in section 3-603. When this section is examined, the ques-
tion becomes whether the adverse claim procedure in the Code displaced the
common law revocation of agency method of stopping collection of an item.
37
33. See id. §§ 4-201(1), 4-208, 4-209.
34. Id. § 4-401 comment 1.
35. Id. § 9-503.
36. This is so for two reasons: (I) if an item had not yet been received, the payor would
have to verify that the call had come from the holder; and (2) the only description of the item
is given by the owner, which may not be fully accurate.
37. See U.C.C. § 3-603 (1978).
1987]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1987
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Arguably, when the owner has a claim to an item adverse or superior to that
of the collecting bank holder, the adverse claim procedure provides the only
means by which an owner can stop collection after revoking agency status.
An in-depth analysis of the procedure is necessary to resolve this question.
Section 3-603 provides that the liability of a party on an instrument is
discharged to the extent of his payment to the holder of the instrument, even
though payment is made with knowledge of a claim of another person to
the instrument, unless the person making the claim provides the liable party
with indemnity or obtains an injunction against the payment of the instru-
ment.38 The Official Comments to section 3-603 stress that the paying party
should not: be inconvenienced by a dispute between two other parties.
Therefore, the paying party may ignore an adverse claim unless indemnity
that it deems to be adequate is provided or a court order prohibits payment
of the instrument.9
Use of the adverse claim procedure has not been applied in a context which
involves insolvent banks, presumably because the incidence of insolvency has
only recently reappeared and the 'procedure has not yet found its way into
the litigation process. The procedure has, however, been applied in contexts
where the bank was unwilling to accept an order not to pay, usually involving
a cashier's check where the remitter had no right to stop payment.
The closest application of the adverse claim procedure to the New Cove-
nant situation was in Santos v. First National State Bank,'40 where the loss
of a cashier's check in the mail prompted the payee to request the issuing
bank to provide a duplicate. Under these facts, it is unlikely that a holder
with a claim would come forth. A bank, however, cannot afford to make
such an assumption. Accordingly, the bank in Santos demanded indemnifica-
tion, but the payee did not have the financial resources to obtain it. Conse-
quently, the bank refused to issue another check. The court ordered the bank
to issue the payee a certificate of deposit to be held, With interest paid, for
the statutory period for which the lost check could be successfully presented
for payment."' The court reasoned that to require another check without in-
demnification could expose the bank to a risk of loss through no fault of
its own."2
38. Id. If the item is a regular check, the bank is not liable at all and section 3-603 is inap-
plicable. In such cases, the owner should prevail on the drawer to stop payment because if the
bank stops payment at the request of the owner, the bank faces liability under section 4-402
to the drawer. If the check is a teller's check (i.e., a check drawn by the bank on itself), then
the owner can induce the drawer bank to stop payment and follow section 3-603 if the bank
is sued on its drawer's contract. If the check is certified, section 3-603 works the same as if
the check is a cashier's check.
39. Id. § 3-603 comment 3.
40. 186 N.J. Super. 52, 451 A.2d 401 (1982).
41. Id., 451 A.2d at 414.
42. Id., 451 A.2d at 413. This could occur if the check were indorsed in blank and transferred
to a holder in due course. A comparable problem exists when the depositary bank advances




A further extension of the adverse claim procedure in the cashier's check
context was examined in Dziurak v. Chase Manhattan Bank.4 3 In Dziurak
the court upheld the issuing bank's right to refuse to dishonor its cashier's
check. The court concluded, however, that "as a practical matter" the issue
could have been resolved by several different procedures other than resorting
to litigation. First, relying on section 3-603, the plaintiff could have either
obtained a court order enjoining the bank from paying the check or provided
indemnity to the bank to protect itself from potential liability."' Second, the
bank could have taken the initiative by dishonoring the check after indemnity
was provided and then commencing an interpleader action.
The Dziurak court indicated that payment can be stopped on an item if
the remitter either procures injunction relief or provides indemnity for the
bank. However, even if the remitter pursues neither of these remedies, the
bank may still resolve the situation by refusing to pay the professed holder
and, instead, paying the money into the court, letting the adverse claimants
battle over the proceeds. The bank, however, is not required to pay the money
into the court. Thus, if the customer does not comply with section 3-603(1),
the bank may pay the holder and thereby be discharged from liability.
The adverse claim procedure, which requires indemnity or an injunction
to force the bank to dishonor the item, is preferable to the Wolf remedy
because, by only requiring notice, the process permitted in Wolf leaves the
bank vulnerable. 4" A bank that has issued a cashier's check does not know,
and has no reasonable means of knowing, whether another claim to the check
exists. As far as the bank knows, the party claiming the check has indorsed
it in blank or negotiated it. The bank could do what Wolf suggested and
tender the proceeds into court. However, this would force the bank into in-
convenient litigation and impair the cash equivalency of a cashier's check.
Thus, the better conclusion is that the adverse claim procedure displaces the
common law revocation of agency allowed in Wolf.
The adverse claim procedure, however, is not perfect. Although the protec-
tion of the bank under section 3-603 is thorough and complete, the remitter's
position does not receive the same degree of consideration. Both indemnifica-
tion and injunctive relief are cumbersome and expensive. Moreover, section
3-603 does not provide adequate standards by which the remitter can engage
these procedures.
The Code has not provided a control or standard by which the discretion
43. 58 A.D.2d 103, 396 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1977), aff'd, 44 N.Y.2d 776, 377 N.E.2d 474, 406
N.Y.S.2d 30 (1978). A depositor sued his bank, alleging that the bank should have stopped pay-
ment on a cashier's check issued by the bank in his favor and endorsed by him so as to be
payable to a third party. During the transaction, the bank advised the plaintiff that payment
could not be stopped on the check without a court order.
44. Id., 396 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
45. Id.
46. One could argue the simple notice allowed under the Wolf case is still valid under the
Code because the bank can always implead. But, this forces the bank to dishonor its check and
endure more inconvenience than is contemplated by comment 3 to section 3-603.
1987] NOTES . 697
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of the bank may be gauged in the case of an indemnification. Instead, section
3-603 uses the language "deemed adequate by the party seeking the discharge,"
which allows for potentially excessive flexibility on the part of the bank. For
example, the bank could either completely waive its right to indemnification
by accepting a trifling amount, or it could refuse to deem any amount as
adequate. The courts would certainly impose a good faith standard upon the
bank under section 1-203, but when the court is forced to "second guess"
bank decision:3, the validity of section 3-603 is diminished because it may be
very difficult for the remitter to show a violation of this standard. 41
The use of an injunction by a remitter as provided in section 3-603 also
generates problems in application. In order to comply with the terms of the
section, injunctive relief may only be granted in a suit in which both the owner
and the holder are parties. 4 This may raise jurisdictional problems, such as
service of process, and may also impose an infeasible time frame. Further-
more, the injunction must be obtained prior to payment by the drawee bank.
The remitter does not have much time to interrupt the collection process.
Another problem with section 3-603 arises because the provision does not
provide the standard by which a court may decide whether to grant an in-
junction. In general, irreparable injury is usually required in order to obtain
injunctive relief in other contexts. 4" How can the owner show that its claim
against the insolvent bank will result in an unquestioned loss at this point
in time? Even if it may be able to present a persuasive case, the granting
of an interlocutory injunction has not been held to be a matter of right.5 0
Without an established standard in the statute, the decision may be left to
various peculiarities of local law or the unbridled discretion of the court.
Finally, in order for the adverse claim procedure to apply, the customer's
objection to payment must be one involving an adverse title claim. Section
3-603 has incorporated the common law position that distinguishes claims and
defenses.' The concept of "claim" within this context has traditionally been
restricted to equitable or legal claims of title. In this regard, mere defenses
do not produce the right to pursue an adverse claim. 2 Nevertheless, common
sense dictates that the common law definitional restriction placed on a "claim"
should not interfere with the use of section 3-603 in contexts similar to New
Covenant.
47. See Note, Blocking Payment on a Certified, Cashier's or Bank Check, 73 MicH. L. Rev.
424, 438 (1974).
48. U.C.C. § 3-603 (1978).
49. D. Douas, REmEDiEs 108 (1973).
50. See Note, supra note 47, at 437 n.91.
51. See Wallach, Negotiable Instruments: The Bank Customer's Ability to Prevent Payment
on Various Forms of Checks, 11 IND. L. REv. 579, 593 (1978).
52. Id. at 593-94. A bank was placed in a similar position under the common law of negotiable
instruments where the bank's alternatives were limited, and the bank could be penalized for
choosing the wNtong course. If a bank paid an instrument after receipt of notice of an adverse
title claim, the bank would be liable to the customer. Therefore, the bank had to contend with
the possibility of double liability if it paid an item after receiving notice of the customer's claim.




A recent Georgia case illustrates how section 3-603 might work under New
Covenant circumstances.5 3 In Fulton National Bank v. Delco Corp., the court
held that under the Code a "claim" to an item involved something more than
a defense. The court held that it also included the right to recover the instru-
ment or the proceeds of the instrument."4 The ownership interest referred to
in Fulton seems to be the same as that which the depositor in New Covenant
might have asserted as an adverse claim under section 3-603. The depositor
of an item has an ownership interest that is paramount to any bank in the
collection chain that has become a holder of the item but has not advanced
funds on the item. Therefore, in the New Covenant context, the remitter should
be able to invoke section 3-603 and successfully claim the instrument.
Conclusion
In New Covenant the owner of an item argued that the insolvency of its
bank allowed it to revoke the bank's agency status and corresponding authority
to collect the disputed item. This argument was rejected by the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals because the court erroneously focused on the nature of the
item, rather than the owner's rights in the item. The issue in New Covenant
was not whether an issuing bank could stop payment on a cashier's check.
Rather, the issue was whether the method proposed by the owner (i.e., the
revocation of the depositary bank's agency status) was a viable means by which
a customer could retrieve an uncollected item from the collection process when
the depositary bank became insolvent.
The Code does not clearly indicate whether an owner of an item may halt
the collection process when its depositary bank becomes insolvent. Also, the
Code does not contain a clear-cut means whereby the owner can accomplish
this undertaking. Arguably, the common law notice procedure, as set forth
in Wolf, is preserved. However, if an owner is allowed to utilize the Wolf
method, with notice alone, the payor bank is left in a vulnerable position.
Also, in the case of a cashier's check, the Wolf procedure impairs the instru-
ment's cash equivalency.
One might conclude that section 3-603 displaces the common law method
of Wolf and provides a suitable remedy to the New Covenant problem with
the adverse claim procedure. The adverse claim procedure, however, is inade-
quate for several reasons. First, indemnification and injunctive relief are ex-
cessively expensive, time-consuming, and burdensome to the owner. In fact,
it is very probable that an owner will be denied recovery of its item in most
cases because of financial or time constraints. Second, the Code neither pro-
vides a standard to determine what constitutes "adequate indemnification"
nor a standard to determine whether an injunction should be granted. On
53. 128 Ga. App. 16, 195 S.E.2d 455 (1973). A franchisor sued a franchisee and a bank
to collect payment on a check which represented a franchise fee. The franchise had delivered
to the plaintiff a check that was drawn on the bank's account with a Federal Reserve Bank.
The bank stopped payment on the check at the request of its customer, the franchisee.
54. Id., 195 S.E.2d at 457.
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the other hand, section 3-603 is designed to remove the bank from the dispute,
giving it the most protection possible. This the section does effectively.
Moreover, in the case of cashier's checks, discouraging adverse claims increases
the instrument's cash equivalency. However, section 3-603 does not appear
to give the owner of the instrument sufficient protection and consideration.
An owner is not likely to invoke the adverse claim procedure frivolously.
In a context such as New Covenant, where the amfount of the item exceeds
FDIC insurance, the gravity of the problem is obvious. Without some kind
of relief, the owner would be forced to accept a pro rata distribution of the
insolvent bank's funds. In New Covenant, and in most other cases, this would
not result in full restitution of the item's proceeds. It is submitted that the
Code should at least clearly indicate that an owner can revoke agency and
that section 3-603 is the appropriate procedure by which an owner can force
the bank to refuse payment on the instrument. Moreover, since the adverse
claim procedure presents less danger to the payor bank than other cases, and
less threat to the cash equivalency of the instrument, the section 3-603 proce-
dure should. be eased to make it more readily available to the owner of an
item in the New Covenant and similar situations."
Shelia Tims
55. Protection could be provided to the bank by requiring the remitter to sign an affidavit
attesting to its revocation of agency that would carry penalties for false statement. The bank
could also be given a cause of action for any loss it sustained due to false information.
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